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Պողոսյան Աշոտ 022

THE CONCEPT OF “DIRECT CAUSAL LINK” IN THE PRACTICE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH IT

 

POGHOSYAN ASHOT

Attorney-at-Law, PhD Candidate at the University of Bonn

 

 

Abstract. The article discusses the "direct causal link" doctrine applied by the Constitutional Court of Armenia when admitting cases based on individual applications. Within this framework, particular attention is given to the historical development of the concept of causality, including its evolution in philosophy, physics, and law.

            The main thesis presented is that when dealing with norms situated at different normative levels, the notion of "(direct) causal links" is unconvincing. There are no causal relationships between legal norms as such. Therefore, the requirement put forward by the Constitutional Court that the applicant must sufficiently substantiate in legal terms the existence of a direct causal link between the alleged violation of a fundamental right and the contested legal provision is unconvincing. Moreover, the Court’s practice is particularly problematic when it accepts a case for examination based on an individual application, but later discontinues the proceedings at the adjudication stage, justifying this by stating that it has "revealed" the applicant failed to sufficiently substantiate in legal terms the existence of a direct causal connection between the alleged fundamental rights violation and the contested provision.

Instead, the article proposes replacing this approach with the dogmatic figure of fundamental rights infringement exclusion. Under this framework, the Constitutional Court should focus on determining whether the good protected by a fundamental right has been prima facie restricted or not.

Keywords։ Constitutional Court, direct causal link, fundamental rights, individual complaint, normative level, normative causality, prima facie restriction of a fundamental right.

  

DOI:https://10.63925/18294847-2026.blj22-12

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